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ABSTRACT
Kydland and Prescott (1977) demonstrate that the inability of a discretionary
policymaker to commit to a future plan of action may lead to a suboptimal result. A
promise to follow a better outcome is time-inconsistent: the policymaker has incentives
to ex-post deviate from the announced policy. This study discusses how rules, rather
than discretion, can mitigate the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy.
The second chapter builds a canonical model to demonstrate that the
discretionary policy leads to inflation bias. The model is then modified to examine
solutions suggested by the relevant literature. The third chapter discusses the
trade-offs associated with institutional solutions, in which the policymaker alters the
behavior of the monetary authority. More specifically, I consider three rule-based
solutions: a zero-inflation rule, an independent central bank, and a state-contingent
rule. Finally, I investigate how reputation can alleviate the time consistency problem
even with a discretionary policymaker.




Kydland and Prescott (1977) mostram que a incapacidade de um policymaker
discricionário em se comprometer a um plano de ação futuro pode levar a um resultado
subótimo. Prometer seguir um resultado melhor é temporalmente inconsistente: o
policymaker tem incentivos para desviar, ex-post, da política anunciada. Esse estudo
discute como regras, em vez de discrição, podem atenuar o problema de inconsistência
temporal em política monetária.
O segundo capítulo constrói um modelo canônico para demonstrar como a
política discricionária leva a um viés inflacionário. O modelo é subsequentemente
modificado para examinar soluções sugeridas pela literatura relevante. O terceiro
capítulo discute os trade-offs associados a soluções institucionais, nas quais o
policymaker altera o comportamento da autoridade monetária. Mais especificamente,
considero três soluções: uma regra de inflação zero, um banco central independente,
e uma regra condicional. Por último, investigo como reputação pode diminuir o
problema de inconsistência temporal mesmo com uma política discricionária.




yt Real output at period t
yn Natural output
πt Inflation at period t
α Output sensibility to excess inflation
πet Expected inflation at period t
σ2 Offer shock’s variance
εt Offer shock at period t
y∗ Socially optimal real output
κ Gap between optimal and real output
ϕ Relative preference parameter of society
ϕ̃ Relative preference parameter of the monetary authority
τ Cost for the policymaker to overrule the monetary authority decision
δ Intertemporal discount rate
π̄ Announced future inflation
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1. INTRODUCTION
Monetary policy is a primary instrument to manage aggregate demand in the
short run. Given its importance, economists have debated for decades (and still do)
the best ways to conduct monetary policymaking. Embedded into this discussion is
the debate of rules versus discretion. Should the monetary authority be bounded to a
predetermined plan of action? Or should it have discretionary power to decide the best
policy at the moment, ad-hoc? The debate soon evolved to other related issues among
economists and political scientists. Should the central bank be independent? What’s
the optimal governance structure for a monetary authority? How accountable should
the central bank be? How to shield policymaking from short-sighted voters-seekers
politicians?
Kydland and Prescott (1977) pioneered the debate by showing that
discretionary policy often produces an inefficient equilibrium. The inefficiency arises
from the incapacity of the discretionary policymaker to ex-ante credibly commit to the
socially optimal policy. A promise to pursue this optimal policy is time-inconsistent:
the policymaker has ex-post incentives to deviate from the announcement. In
monetary policy, the inefficient outcome emerges as higher than optimal inflation with
no output benefit. This excess inflation is called inflation bias. There are many possible
theoretical explanations for the existence of an inflation bias, and I will briefly mention
some, but my objective here is specific. I want to focus on the problem of dynamic time
inconsistency.
This study guides the reader throughout the rules versus discretion debate,
developing the relevant models. I intend to do this in a didactic approach, using a
standard notation across models, and stressing the relevance and robustness of the
assumptions. I also organized an extensive mathematical appendix, explaining most
of the mathematical steps necessary to arrive at the exposed equations. With the help
of this appendix, a reader with basic mathematical skills should be able to reach the
results themselves.
First, I explain why the time inconsistency problem emerges in general and
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subsequently develop a canonical model to demonstrate it in monetary policy. Then I
start addressing solutions in which the policymaker alters the behavior of the monetary
authority. I build three models exploring these solutions: a zero-inflation rule, an
independent conservative central bank, and a state-contingent rule. Next, I consider
how reputation might alleviate the problem. I will develop two game theory models
that build around the idea of reputation. Finally, I discuss the relevance of time
inconsistency today.
2. TIME INCONSISTENCY UNDER THE
DISCRETIONARY POLICY
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first introduces the reader to the
time inconsistency problem, explaining under which conditions it might emerge. The
second builds a canonical model that demonstrates how it appears under discretionary
policymaking in monetary policy.
2.1 WHY DISCRETION IS SUBOPTIMAL
Kydland and Prescott (1977) famously show that even a benevolent
policymaker may lead to an inefficient outcome by behaving discretionarily. It’s
worthwhile to precise what discretion means in this discussion: it means that the
policymaker can choose (at his discretion) a policy given the current circumstances. It’s
from this discretion that emerges the difficulty of the policymaker to credibly commit
to a plan of action. The commitment may be time-inconsistent: when the time to fulfill
the action comes, it may be optimal to deviate from the promised policy, given the
circumstances.
One could look at this result and not be impressed, "politicians are always
lying to us," some could say. But the policymaker is assumed to be benevolent. There
shouldn’t be a conflict of interests. Or so it seems. Even a policymaker aligned with
the social preferences might not act as promised. Why would a policymaker do such a
thing? The short answer is that he would do it for the benefit of society. After all, he is
benevolent.
The problem with this tendency to look for social welfare is that it can backfire.
By attempting to do good, the discretionary policy will, instead, do harm. Why? So
far, I have talked about one agent: the policymaker. But there is another essential one:
rational private agents. Rationality doesn’t imply that they have perfect eyesight and
can predict the future accurately. It only means they observe how the policymaker
acts, forming expectations endogenously. And, as with most economic models, their
3
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expectations matter. They matter because it’s their interaction with the policymaker’s
actions that will produce the equilibrium outcomes. It’s from this interplay between
the rational expectations and the discretionary policy that emerges the inefficient
result.
Why would private agents form expectations that would decrease social
welfare? We will see formally how this happens, but the intuition is that rational agents
don’t like being deceived, even for their own good.
Because the policymaker is discretionary, he always sets the optimal policy
given the already-formed private expectations. The problem is that the discretionary
policy doesn’t consider its effects on expectations. The private agents know how
the policymaker behaves, so they form expectations such that the policymaker hasn’t
incentives to deceive. The final result is inefficient: there’s an equilibrium in which
everyone would be better off. But this Pareto superior equilibrium isn’t attainable
through discretionary policymaking.
The broad picture is: in a dynamic system with rational agents, the
policymaker’s behavior affects the expectations. By not considering its effects on
expectations, the discretionary policy might worsen the results.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) suggest how to solve the problem: rules. Time
inconsistency only exists because the policymaker has discretionary power to decide,
ad-hoc, which policy to follow. The inefficiency derives from the policymaker’s
inability to commit credibly to a future plan of action. If he obeyed a binding rule,
from which he couldn’t deviate, then there’s no time inconsistency. That’s why their
seminal paper is considered the precursor of the rules versus discretion debate.
That said, it’s important to mark that rule-based policy wasn’t a new idea. In
the field of monetary theory, we can trace back the defense of policy rules back to Fisher
(1919) or even Wicksell (1907). Friedman (1948) famously advocates a constant growth
rate for the money supply. The difference relies on why Kydland and Prescott (1977)
defend rules: avoiding a time inconsistency problem in a dynamic setup with rational
agents.
In practice, there are several reasons to support rules rather than discretion
besides time inconsistency. Taylor (2017), in a review of rule-based policy, lists some
additional reasons, such as less short-run political pressure, reduction of uncertainty,
and greater accountability. For an extensive survey on the technical detail for rules, the
reader can see McCallum (1999) and Taylor and Williams (2010). My focus here will be
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around the time inconsistency.
I want to stress that the time inconsistency problem isn’t exclusive to monetary
policy. It applies to a broad range of real-world problems. It can occur whenever an
agent (not necessarily a policymaker) cannot credibly commit themselves to future
behavior. I will comment on some examples in the chapter prior to the conclusion.
2.2 DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY
The latter section laid the intuition behind the time inconsistency problem
under the discretionary policy. This section formalizes the discussion around a
canonical model showing how this problem arises in monetary policymaking. This
model is the foundation from which the future models will develop.
The model presented is very similar to the one developed by Barro and Gordon
(1983a). They weren’t the first to apply the time inconsistency problem to monetary
policy: Kydland and Prescott (1977) and also Calvo (1978) expose similar models.
Real output follows a typical expectations-augmented supply curve:
yt = yn + α(πt − πet ) + εt (2.2.1)
Where εt are offer shocks that follow a normal distribution with zero mean
and variance σ2. As usual, inflation is expansionary: an inflation rate above the
expected level will push output above its natural level yn. α is a positive parameter
that measures how sensitive output is to excess inflation.
This specification, together with rational expectations, implies that, in
equilibrium, the expected output must equal the natural level. This must be true
because rational expectations require that πet = E[πt]. Such that:
E[yt] = E [yn + α(πt − πet ) + εt]
= yn + αE(πt − πet ) + E[εt]
= yn
(2.2.2)
There are only two agents: a policymaker that controls monetary policy and
private agents that form inflation expectation. As mentioned earlier, the policymaker
is benevolent, meaning that its objective is to maximize social welfare. To build a social
welfare function for our models, it’s common to postulate that people dislike inflation
and would like the output to be around the socially optimal level y∗. The functional
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form of the social loss function (such that the higher the value of the loss function, the
lower the social welfare) is:
L ≡ π2t + ϕ(yt − y∗)2 (2.2.3)
Where ϕ represents the relative preference that society gives to income
stabilization around y∗ in detriment of inflation-fighting. For example, a society with a
low value ofϕ doesn’t care much about output stabilization and prefers lower inflation.
The implicit inflation bliss-point is zero, but this can be relaxed by changing the term
π2t with (πt− π∗)2, where π∗ is the inflation bliss-point 1. Naturally, this specification of
the loss function is a simplification, and it’s possible to take different forms. Barro and
Gordon (1983a) actually work with a linear welfare function, instead of a quadratic
one 2. Also, in real life, the private agents probably have different preferences. For
example, someone in debt would like a bit more inflation, such that the real value of the
debt is smaller. The use of a social welfare function hides this heterogeneity. I mention
this to remind the reader to be skeptical of the "everyone is better off" argument. The
Pareto superiority of the outcomes is a consequence of using the welfare function that
abstracts from complexity.
An essential assumption is that the socially optimal output is higher than the
natural output, that is, yn < y∗. There are several reasons to justify this assumption.
Barro and Gordon (1983a) mention that inefficiencies caused by taxation make the
natural level to be lower than the efficient level. Clarida et al. (1999) and other
New-Keynesian models work under an imperfect competition framework, which also
creates similar inefficiencies. Likewise, Cukierman (1992) argues that unions keep real
wages above the market-clearing level. To simplify the notation, I denote this gap
between the optimal level and the natural one as κ ≡ y∗ − yn > 0.
The timing of events:
1. Private agents form πet
2. εt is realized
3. Policymaker sets πt
The timing structure is crucial for two main reasons. First, when the
1Society could want a marginally positive rate of inflation, see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) for a
discussion of the optimal inflation rate.
2See Cukierman (1992) for a discussion on the different types of welfare functions.
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policymaker decides which level of inflation to set, the private agents have already
formed the expectations. The policymaker, therefore, considers inflation expectation
as given. Second, because the policymaker observes the offer shock, he can mitigate
the effects on output.
As an alternative specification, it’s possible to work with wage formation
instead of inflation expectation. Private agents sign one-period wage contracts
rationally, hence they can’t rapidly react to offer shocks, but the policymaker can. This
approach is interesting because it makes it explicit that this timing implies a one-period
nominal rigidity. I made this digression to explain that it’s from this timing that derives
the non-neutrality of monetary policy in the short-term, even though we have rational
agents.
The objective of the policymaker is to minimize social loss (or, equivalently,
maximize social welfare). He can manipulate the inflation level to achieve this goal. I
assume that the policymaker can set whatever rate of inflation perfectly. It would be
possible to add instrument uncertainty3, but I will stick with the simplification. So the
policymaker solves the following problem:
min
πt
π2t + ϕ(yt − y∗)2 (2.2.4)
We can substitute yt with the supply curve (2.2.1) and solve the optimization
problem. As mentioned in the introduction, the appendix contains detailed
explanations for most of the mathematical steps. This way, the main text is not polluted
with mathematical development, and the curious reader can also be satisfied. Look for
a clickable link after the equation to go to the appendix. The first-order condition of




[κ+ απet − εt] (2.2.5)
Appendix A.1.1
We can interpret this expression as the reaction function of the policymaker,
given the parameters and the observed variables. For example, a negative offer shock
makes the policymaker react by increasing inflation, such that the effect of the shock
on output is dampened.
3For example, the monetary authority uses a policy instrument (the growth of the money supply),
but demand shocks affect the final equilibrium. See Walsh (2017) for such an approach.
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The private agents know how the policymaker acts, and form expectations
accordingly. The assumption of rational expectations implicitly set their loss function
as:
Lp ≡ (πt − πet )
2 (2.2.6)
In practice it means that the agents will take the expected value of the
monetary authority reaction function. Remember that they don’t observe the offer
shock. Solving the problem of the private agents we obtain:
πet = ϕακ (2.2.7)
Appendix: A.1.2
Now that we have an expression for the inflation expectation, we can put it in
the monetary authority reaction function to find equilibrium inflation. We can do the










Here we can already see one of the main results highlighted by Kydland and
Prescott (1977). The equilibrium inflation has a part (ϕακ) fully predicted by the private
agents. Consequently, this part has no expansionary effect. This excess inflation that
has no benefit is the inflation bias.
Observe what parameters affect the inflation bias (ϕακ). If society puts a
higher weight on output stabilization (↑ ϕ), it leads to a higher inflation bias. The
higher the sensibility of output to surprise inflation (↑ α), the higher the inflation bias.
Also, a larger gap between the natural and the optimal output (↑ κ) leads to more
inflation bias.
It’s easy to note that society is better off if the monetary authority would set
πt = − ϕα1+ϕα2 εt. As I will comment afterward, this is the socially optimal rule. So why
doesn’t the policymaker do that? And remember: the policymaker is benevolent. To
demonstrate this, let’s assume that people believed that the expected inflation would
2.2. DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY 9







be zero. But then the policymaker could improve social welfare by increasing inflation





The policymaker has incentives to produce surprise inflation. But this can’t
be an equilibrium because agents are rational. The private agents know the monetary
authority would want to set higher inflation if their expected inflation is too low. So
they raise the inflation they expect until the policymaker has no incentive to deceive the
private agents. That’s why Barro and Gordon (1983a) consider discretionary monetary
policymaking inefficient. The average inflation produced is higher than it should be,
without any advantage.
Before moving to potential solutions for the inflation bias, it’s worthwhile to
find a benchmark. What is the socially optimal level of inflation? In this case, the
monetary authority would consider the expected inflation as endogenous. The socially
optimal policy provides the same stabilization of offer shocks, but without the inflation
bias:

















It’s easy to see that this result is better than the discretionary equilibrium, but
we can see it more concretely by computing the expected welfare loss of each scenario.
We need to input the equilibrium outcomes into the loss function and take the expected













And the expected welfare loss associated with the socially optimal equilibrium
yields:
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This socially optimal rule cannot be the equilibrium because of the incentives
faced by the discretionary monetary authority. Nonetheless, it’s useful to have it as a
benchmark.
The results exposed in Barro and Gordon (1983a) suggest that discretionary
monetary policy is suboptimal, but the authors depend on many assumptions to arrive
at this conclusion. One of the crucial assumptions is that the monetary authority
wants to set output above the natural level. Blinder (1999), ex-Vice Chairman of
the FED, argues that this doesn’t happen in practice. That said, with a different
model framework it’s possible to have an inflation bias even without this assumption.
Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) achieve this by assuming that the policymaker is
uncertain about the economy’s state and has asymmetrical preferences (recessions are
worse than booms). I will further discuss the empirical evidence after addressing the
independent central bank.
3. INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS
This chapter discusses how the policymaker can alter the behavior of the
monetary authority to diminish the time inconsistency problem. I build three different
models exploring these institutional solutions: a zero-inflation rule, an independent
central bank, and a state-contingent rule.
3.1 ZERO-INFLATION RULE
Since Kydland and Prescott (1977) exposed the time inconsistency problem,
economists have sought solutions to solve it. As we will see, there are many (potential)
ways to mitigate this problem. I start with the one that Kydland and Prescott (1977)
suggested: a simple rule.
I need to introduce another agent: the central bank. In the previous models, I
used the terms policymaker and monetary authority (central bank) interchangeably. I
could do so because there was no distinction in the objectives of these two agents. Now
they are two separate agents. The policymaker is still benevolent, but he can change
the behavior of the central bank. The monetary authority, in turn, sets inflation seeking
to pursue the objective that the policymaker has determined.
The timing of events:
1. Policymaker instructs the monetary authority to set inflation πt = 0 ∀t
2. Private agents form πet
3. εt is realized
4. Monetary authority sets πt
For this model, the policymaker will instruct the central bank to set inflation at
zero4, always. It’s a simple rule that private agents can easily verify. The equilibrium
outcomes for this scenario would be:
4The social bliss-point of inflation is zero, but if it was π∗ > 0 the rule could be πt = π∗ ∀t.
12
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πt = 0
πet = 0
yt = yn + εt
(3.1.1)




There’s no expected inflation, so there’s no inflation bias. The problem is
solved! However, mind the catch. The offer shock affects output fully. Compare
this with the discretionary equilibrium (2.2.8). There the inflation response has a
stabilization effect.
Therefore, by following a strict zero inflation rule, the monetary policy loses
its stabilization effect. But it manages to diminish inflation. This rule accomplishes
something that the people want (lower inflation) at the cost of something that people
don’t want (a more volatile output). The result shouldn’t shock any economist: there
is no such thing as a free lunch, only trade-offs. But the policymaker wonders: which
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Appendix A.2.1
The policymaker can compare the expected welfare loss of discretionary policy
to the one of a simple rule and see in which situation one trumps the other. A simple
zero-inflation rule is better than discretionary policy if and only if:
σ2 < κ2(1 + ϕα2) (3.1.3)
Appendix A.2.2
When the offer shock’s variance is below a certain threshold, the gains
stemming from lower inflation outweigh the stabilization costs. This result makes
intuitive sense. By following a simple rule we have no stabilization policy, but if the
variance of shocks is already low, then stabilization isn’t that crucial.
Here we compare the outcomes from two extremes (zero-inflation against the
discretionary policy), but can’t we seek middle ground? In the next section, I build
a model that better explores this trade-off between inflation-fighting and stabilization
policy.
3.2 INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK
In the previous section, we discovered a trade-off between discretionary policy
and a zero-inflation rule. Under certain circumstances, one is better than the other. But
what if we could seek an intermediary option between these policies? After all, if there
is a trade-off, then there is an optimal level.
That’s what Rogoff (1985) proposes. In the model, the policymaker chooses
the inflation-fighting relative preference of the monetary authority5. By changing this
parameter, the policymaker affects the central bank’s behavior (and, indirectly, the
private agent’s). In effect, it means that he can move between the outcomes of the
discretionary policy and the zero-inflation rule. The (somewhat) shocking result is
that it’s always optimal for society to have a central bank that weighs inflation-fighting
more vigorously than society itself does.
5Alesina and Grilli (1991) develop a model in which it’s the median voter that chooses this
parameter, the results are similar.
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The timing of events:
1. Policymaker determines the monetary authority’s preference parameter ϕ̃
2. Private agents form πet
3. εt is realized
4. Monetary authority sets πt
The policymaker chooses the relative preference of the central bank ϕ̃. The
monetary authority then solves the familiar optimization problem:
min
πt
π2t + ϕ̃(yt − y∗)2 (3.2.1)
Notice that the only difference so far is that I substituted ϕ, the true relative
preference of society, with ϕ̃, the one the policymaker assigned to the central bank.
This assignment is common knowledge, such that the private agents know it. The












What happens if the policymaker decides to set ϕ̃ = 0? Then we are back to
the simple rule case (3.1.1). And with ϕ̃ = ϕwe are in the discretionary case (2.2.8). But
the policymaker can choose an intermediary scenario with ϕ̃ ∈ [0, ϕ]. The policymaker
assigns the optimal ϕ̃ that minimizes the expected social welfare loss. That is, he solves
















Note that this is the social welfare loss function, not the central bank’s. Remark
the ϕ instead of ϕ̃ at the beginning of the second term.
Unfortunately, it’s impossible to find a simple tractable equation with the
optimal parameter ϕ̃ as a function of the other variables and parameters. But in the
3.2. INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK 16







appendix A.3.1 I show that the optimal level is in the interval (0, ϕ). This means that
society is better off with a central bank that is more conservative, in the sense that it
puts a higher weight on inflation-fighting.
Although it’s not possible to find a nice expression for the optimal ϕ̃, it’s















Rogoff’s solution - the policymaker nominating a more conservative (inflation-
focused) central banker - was very influential. One could argue that it influenced the
support for independent central banks. The model makes an empirical prediction:
countries with independent central banks should have lower inflation and higher
output variance. Alesina (1988), Grilli et al. (1991), and many others find that monetary
authority independence is associated with low inflation. Indeed, since the ’90s, the
institutional design of central banks has shifted towards greater independence6. But,
6See Cukierman (1996).
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contrary to what Rogoff’s model suggests, the link between independence and real
indicators doesn’t seem to be very strong. Alesina and Summers (1993) find little
evidence that central bank independence benefits or harms economic performance.
A related branch of literature is the political economy of monetary policy.
The models I develop here all assume that policymakers are benevolent, a strong
assumption. What happens if political actors with short-term goals control
policymaking? Most of the political economy models predict that the policymakers
will distort policy to reap short-horizon gains. Nordhaus (1975) famously showed that
politicians have incentives to attempt expansionary policies when seeking reelection.
See Persson and Tabellini (1999) for a survey of the literature. I mention this here
because it’s another justification to isolate monetary policymaking from policymakers.
I want to end this section with a provocation. We assume that the policymaker
delegates monetary policy to an independent agent. Couldn’t the policymaker
discretionarily take this independence back? Is the delegation decision itself time
consistent? Imagine, for instance, that the policymaker has decided to grant monetary
policy to an independent central bank that highly values inflation-fighting. But then
an extremely negative offer shock hits the economy. The policymaker has incentives to
overrule the independence of the monetary authority and accommodate the shock.
This possibility is absent in this model because we assumed that the policymaker
is not able to do that. This assumption is not very realistic given that, in practice,
policymakers have the discretion to make these changes. I relax this assumption in the
next section.
3.3 STATE-CONTINGENT RULE
In the previous section, I explored one famous solution for the inflation
bias problem: the independent conservative central bank. The optimal choice of
conservatism trades off the lower inflation with the distorted stabilization policy. The
result is a higher expected social welfare. Take a careful look at this previous sentence.
Note the word "expected." If the offer shock is large, then society can be worse off
with the conservative central bank. We can see this somewhat reflected in the model
by observing that the higher the volatility of the offer shocks σ2, the more aligned the
monetary authority will be with society (ϕ̃ near ϕ).
Flood and Isard (1989) and also Lohmann (1992) address this problem
explicitly with a state-contingent rule. The policymaker nominates a central banker
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with a relative preference coefficient ϕ̃, but the monetary authority isn’t entirely
independent. The policymaker reserves itself the right to overrule the monetary
authority decision and set inflation directly. However, when the policymaker does
that, society loses τ > 0 units of welfare.
We can think of τ as influenced by exogenous factors, such as a reputation
cost of overruling the monetary authority. But τ could arguably be endogenous: the
policymaker can influence how costly it is to override the central bank’s independence
through institutional bindings. Granting the central bank de jure independence
through legislation can be seen as setting a high τ . It would take a high political cost to
change the legislation. Nonetheless, it’s hard to justify τ as being infinite as it’s implicit
in the model of the previous section. In times of crisis, such as war, institutions are
often overridden by policymakers, even in strongly democratic countries.
Why would the policymaker overrule the monetary authority? The lower
inflation bias conquered through a conservative central bank has a price: a dampened
response to offer shocks. So in scenarios where the offer shocks are large (be them
positive or negative), it may be optimal to overrule the central bank’s decision. That’s
a state-contingent rule: it’s conditional on the magnitude of the offer shock.
We saw in the previous section that we could think of the discretionary model
and the simple zero-inflation rule as being specific cases of the independent central
bank model. We can think of the independent central bank model as a case of the
state-contingent rule model: When the cost of overruling the monetary authority τ is
infinite, we’re back to the traditional independent central bank. Basically, we’re adding
a new margin of adjustment.
The timing of events:
1. Policymaker determines the monetary authority’s preference parameter ϕ̃
2. Private agents form πet
3. εt is realized
4. Policymaker decides to overrule or not
5. πt is realized
The superscript I refers to the independent central bank and O for the
overruling scenario. For example, πIt refers to the inflation the monetary authority
would set if it kept its independence.
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As in the previous section, the problem that the central bank solves is:
min
πt
π2t + ϕ̃(yt − y∗)2 (3.3.1)
The reaction function of the independent central bank, conditional on the




[κ+ απet − εt] (3.3.2)
That’s the reaction for the independent conservative monetary authority. What
would be the inflation that the policymaker would set if he decided to overrule?




π2t + ϕ(yt − y∗)2 (3.3.3)





[κ+ απet − εt] (3.3.4)
Let’s compute the welfare loss associated with each scenario: the central bank
setting inflation πIt , and with the policymaker overruling the decision and producing
πOt . Because we’re talking about a state-contingent rule, we must not take the expected
value.
LI = ϕ+ ϕ̃
2α2
(1 + ϕ̃α2)2








The central bank keeps its independence and is allowed to set inflation if LO >
LI , and this happens if and only if:
τ >
α2(ϕ− ϕ̃)2
(1 + ϕα2)(1 + ϕ̃α2)2
[κ+ απet − εt]
2 (3.3.6)
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Appendix A.4.2
Let us formally define the set "I" for the situations in which (3.3.6) is satisfied,
such that the offer shock doesn’t trigger intervention. Similarly, denote the set "O" for
the circumstances in which the εt is of such magnitude that the policymaker intervenes.
I =
{
εt ∈ R : τ >
α2(ϕ− ϕ̃)2
(1 + ϕα2)(1 + ϕ̃α2)2





The right-hand side of the equation (3.3.6) can be seen as the welfare benefits
of overruling and the left-hand side as the costs. Observe that, as ϕ̃ gets nearer ϕ, the
gains of overruling get smaller, given that the central bank is already very aligned with
society. A central bank that is much more conservative than society (large ϕ − ϕ̃) will








That is, as the central bank gets aligned with society, the set of values of εt that
trigger overriding becomes smaller. Another exposition for the expression (3.3.6) is the
following:
κ+ απet − Ω ≤ εt ≤ κ+ απet + Ω (3.3.9)
Where Ω ≡ 1+ϕ̃α2
α(ϕ−ϕ̃)
√
τ(1 + ϕα2). Appendix A.4.2
Figure 3.3 makes it easier to visualize this expression. It’s the plot of a generic
probability density function for εt (remember that εt ∼ N(0, σ2) ). If the shock is in
the blue area of the graph, then the condition (3.3.9) is satisfied, and the central bank
sets inflation independently. For shocks in the orange area, the policymaker intervenes.
Remark the lack of symmetry of the areas. A negative shock triggers intervention more
easily than a positive one: a negative shock may trigger intervention while a positive
shock of the same magnitude may not.





[κ+ απet − εt] if εt ∈ I
ϕα
1 + ϕα2
[κ+ απet − εt] if εt ∈ O
(3.3.10)
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FIGURE 3.3. Probability density function of εt and overruling situations












FIGURE 3.4. Inflation under the state-contingent rule
εt
πt
κ+ απe − Ω
κ+ απe + Ω
One thing that I haven’t addressed so far is the inflation expectation formation.
The expectations are a bit more complex in this model because they need to account
for the possibility of an overruling (given that it will affect inflation). Let us denote
p ≡ Pr{εt ∈ I}, then we have:
πet = pE[πIt |εt ∈ I] + (1− p)E[πOt |εt ∈ O] (3.3.11)
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Expected inflation is trickier because the expected value of the shock εt
conditional on the state of intervention isn’t zero. To grasp this, I recommend that
the reader take another look at the probability density graph (3.3). The area in which




The consequence is that E[εt|εt ∈ I] > 0. By the symmetry of the normal distribution,
it follows that E[εt|εt ∈ O] < 0.
How should we interpret this? The intuitive answer is that the policymaker
will usually intervene when negative shocks hit. This explanation is correct, but
the reason is that the optimal output is higher than the natural output. Because
positive shocks push the output closer to the optimal level (to a certain degree), the
policymaker’s intervention is asymmetrical.
Accommodation for large shocks and a conservative approach in "normal"
times is, arguably, a desirable feature7. Having this escape clause allows the society
to choose an intermediate option between a fully independent central banker and
discretionary policymaking.
I also argue that this model is more realistic than the fully independent central
bank model. Just as policymakers have the power to delegate monetary policy, they
have the power to take it back. τ can be very high if independence is granted firmly by
institutional means, such as through a constitutional amendment, but it’s not infinite.
And probably shouldn’t.
This model can shed light on why countries with low institutional strength (to
be interpreted as a low τ ) have difficulty maintaining an independent central bank that
is much more conservative than society (a high ϕ − ϕ̃). If the I set is small, such that
even moderate shocks trigger intervention, then πet will be very near the discretionary
inflation πOt . The benefits of a de jure independent monetary authority only exist if this
independence is de facto credible.
7See Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) for another model with this feature, but through a very different
mechanism.
4. EXPLORING REPUTATION AS A SOLUTION
This chapter explores how the inflation bias problem is alleviated if the
policymaker has a mechanism to build a reputation. The first section builds a model of
an infinitely repeated game that deviates from the assumption of rational agents. The
second section shows that even in a finite period game and with rational agents the
reputational equilibrium is possible.
4.1 REPUTATION IN AN INFINITE GAME
Besides institutional arrangements such as an independent central bank, there
might be other solutions for the inflation bias problem. Barro and Gordon (1983b)
famously explore one of these solutions. In their setup, the policymaker might want to
build a reputation of setting low inflation, even being a discretionary agent.
We need to understand how the reputational model differs from the traditional
discretionary model to achieve these results. First, the agents play an infinite-period
game: the monetary authority 8 setting inflation and the private agents forming
inflation expectation. Before agents set their expectations, the central bank announces
that inflation will be π̄ for the next period. The private agents play a tit-for-tat strategy:
they start believing the central bank, but if the central bank does not set inflation as
promised, then the agents will always expect the discretionary level of inflation. The
assumption of a tit-for-tat strategy is essential for this model. It’s a departure from
rational expectations, but it’s a justifiable one given that there are several real situations
in which people do seem to play tit-for-tat.
A savvy reader might already grasp the mechanisms that allow the monetary
authority to build a reputation. If the central bank honors his promise, then he can
keep inflation at the lower announced level. But the monetary authority also has
an opportunity in the first period9: because inflation expectations are lower than the
8Here there’s no distinction between the central bank and the policymaker. I will use the terms
interchangeably.
9Actually this opportunity also exists in the other periods, but because if the central bank would
23
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discretionary level, the one-period best response would be higher than announced
inflation. The intertemporal cost of this deception is that they will return to the
discretionary equilibrium afterward. The central bank weights the short-term benefits
of one-period deception against the long-term benefits of cooperation. Naturally, the
decision will depend on how impatient the central bank is. More formally, it means





π2t + ϕ(yt − y∗)2
]
(4.1.1)
Where δ is the central bank’s intertemporal discount factor.
I need to make a strong simplification to develop the model more easily: there
isn’t offer shocks. I will comment at the end of this section on why we need this
assumption and how things may change by relaxing it. The simplified offer curve
for this chapter will be:
yt = yn + α(πt − πet ) (4.1.2)
Another common simplification, but one I won’t be making here, is to use an
alternative society loss function linear in output, instead of a quadratic one. The reason
for this simplification is that it makes it much easier to find tractable equations. I will
stick with our usual loss function for consistency’s sake, even though the mathematical
expression won’t end up so neat. The reader can see Walsh (2017) for the development
of this model with the simpler loss function.
The timing of events:
1. Policymaker announces that inflation for next period will be π̄
2. Private agents form πet = π̄
3. Policymaker sets πt
4. Private agents observe if policymaker kept his promise and form πet+1
playing a tit-for-tat strategy
5. The game continues ad infinitum . . .
The game starts with the monetary authority announcing that inflation in the
next period will be π̄, lower than the discretionary equilibrium inflation. The private
deceive people, it would certainly do that in the first period because in the future periods the gains
would be the intertemporally smaller given the discount factor.
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agents believe the announcement, forming expectations such that πet = π̄. Let’s first
assume that the central bank decided to keep its promise. The expected social loss
associated with the cooperation equilibrium is:
E[L] = π̄2 + ϕκ2 (4.1.3)
Appendix A.5.1
If the central bank maintains the inflation at the announced level in all periods,
then the expected intertemporal social loss function is:
∞∑
i=0







Now let’s assume that the monetary authority chooses to break the promise in











It’s not hard to show that the one-period deception is better for society (lower
welfare loss) than the cooperation equilibrium (demonstrated in the appendix A.5.3
). But the central bank needs to consider the consequences of the betrayal. After





The expected one-period welfare loss associated with the discretionary
equilibrium is the same we already calculated in equation (2.2.11) (without the σ2):
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E[L] = ϕκ2(1 + ϕα2) (4.1.8)
The expected intertemporal social loss function associated with an initial
deception from the central bank and then going back to discretionary equilibrium is:
∞∑
i=0










We can represent the one-period payoffs (actually negative payoffs, since we’re
using a loss function) of this repeated game in a payoff-matrix 4.1. "Trust" means
that the private agents expect the announced inflation. If they "Distrust", then they
expect the discretionary inflation, that is πet = ϕακ. Remember that the implicit welfare
function of rational private agents is given by the expression (2.2.6).








, (ϕακ− π̄)2 ϕκ2(1 + ϕα2) , 0
I’ve colored the optimal one-period response of the private agents and the
policymaker given the action of the other agent, blue and red respectively. Deceiving
is a dominant one-period strategy for the policymaker. As it’s expected the Nash
Equilibrium of the one-period game is (Deceive, Distrust). That’s the same as the
discretionary equilibrium.
The outcomes (Set π̄, Trust) are Pareto superior to the Nash Equilibrium
(Deceive, Distrust), meaning that both agents would be better off under that
equilibrium. If the game were finite, then the only sequential equilibrium possible
would be the Nash Equilibrium10. But this is an infinitely repeated game, and these
10The monetary authority would have incentives to deceive in the last period. The private agents
would know that and would anticipate that movement. By backward induction, the equilibrium would
be the discretionary one.
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games have a nice feature. If the central bank is sufficiently future-sighted (δ near 1),
then by the Folk Theorem11 there’s an equilibrium in which both agents cooperate and
reach the Pareto superior equilibrium (Set π̄, Trust).
Another way to demonstrate that the reputational equilibrium is viable is by

















It’s not easy to isolate δ in this expression. I will reserve for the appendix A.5.5
to show that, under certain conditions, a high discount factor makes it worthwhile for
the policymaker to pursue lower inflation.
The takeaway is that if the policymaker is sufficiently future-sighted, then
it’s worth it to build a reputation. Reputation building models are attractive because
they are intuitive and have real-world resemblance. Some caveats are not present in
this model that are worthy of mention. The reputational equilibrium might not be
possible if the public cannot easily monitor the policy instrument. Here the private
agents could observe if monetary authority was following the non-discretionary path.
If inflation was not the announced one, they knew they were being deceived. But if the
monetary instrument or its effects is not clearly observable, then accountability to the
announcement becomes much trickier. This possibility is absent by assumption in the
model, but it should be a problem in real-life scenarios. Stokey (2002) discusses this
issue, focusing on the trade-off between observability and precision of instruments.
Also, remember the simplification εt = 0 ∀t. The reason for this assumption
may be clear after reading the state-contingent rule section. If a large shock hits the
economy, then even a very future-sighted policymaker may decide to abandon the
reputational equilibrium to stabilize output. This possibility makes it very hard to
maintain the reputational equilibrium. That said, if the penalty structure of the private
agents were different, then this isn’t such a big deal. For example, imagine that instead
of always expecting the discretionary after deception, the private agents only expect
it for one period. That is, the private agents continue to give "second chances" to the
policymaker. Under this penalty scheme, it’s possible to have offer shocks and still
build a reputation.
11This theorem is called that way because it was well known among game theorists in the 50s’, but no
one had published it. It refers to a class of theorems with some resemblance and marginal differences.
See, for example, Friedman (1971) .
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4.2 REPUTATION IN A FINITE GAME
Two of the main criticisms over Barro and Gordon (1983b) are the departure
from rational expectations and the necessity of an infinite period12. The following
model, inspired by Backus and Driffill (1985), addresses these issues. It shows that,
under certain circumstances, a discretionary central bank might want to build a
reputation even with finite time and rational agents.
The setup of this model is a game of incomplete information13. The central
bank may be of two types: conservative or discretionary. The conservative14 always
sets inflation equal to zero, independent of expectations. The discretionary wants
to minimize the social loss function. The private agents don’t know which type the
central bank is, only the probability of each scenario. The agents infer the likelihood of
each type by looking at the monetary authority’s actions.
The timing of events:
1. Nature drafts the type of the central bank with known probability
2. Private agents form πe1
3. Central bank sets π1
4. Private agents observe π1 and update their priors, forming πe2
5. Central bank sets π2
The intuition is that the discretionary central bank would like to be perceived
as conservative. He can portray this impression by setting zero inflation, as a
conservative monetary authority would do. The private agents, knowing about this
possibility, update their beliefs in a Bayesian way. The discretionary central bank can
accrue short-term gains by setting positive inflation in the first period or imitate a
conservative central bank to obtain a larger benefit deceiving in the second period.
That’s the trade-offs he must weigh.
We can start building the formal model to show these results. For simplicity’s
sake, lets us illustrate this in a two-period game, but it also works for T ≥ 2 periods. It
helps to build the game in the extensive form to make things easier to grasp, as can be
12Actually, the game can be finite if it doesn’t have a deterministic end. That is: if it ends with a
probability each period.
13The solution concept is the sequential equilibria formulated by Kreps and Wilson (1982).
14In the previous models I used "conservative" to indicate a central bank that had a lower preference
parameter than society. Here conservative has a stronger meaning: the central banks only care about
inflation fighting. You could think of it as the case in which ϕ̃ = 0.
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FIGURE 4.2. Extensive Form: Reputation Game
Nature





















seen in figure 4.2.
The private agents form the expected inflation in the first period by taking an
average of the discretionary inflation and conservative inflation (zero), weighted by
their priors. Let us denote the prior probability that the central bank is discretionary
as p ≡ Pr(D). Similarly, the probability that the central bank is conservative is





[κ+ απet ] (4.2.1)
So the inflation the private agents will expect is:
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πe1 =
pϕα
1 + ϕα2(1− p)
κ (4.2.2)
Appendix A.6.1
In the first period, the discretionary central bank can either set the optimal
discretionary inflation or mimic a conservative central bank setting inflation at zero.
Let us denote the former as πD11 and the latter as πD21 . Given πe1 (4.2.2), the optimal
discretionary response would be:
πD11 =
ϕα
1 + ϕα2(1− p)
κ (4.2.3)
Appendix A.6.2
If the private agents observe πD11 , they know that the central bank is
discretionary. Then the expected inflation for the second period will be the familiar
discretionary one. Let us denote πe12 as this scenario:
πe12 = ϕακ (4.2.4)
If the private agents observe π1 = 0, they don’t know whether the central bank
is really conservative or if he’s just pretending to be. They need to update their priors
about the probability of each scenario, given the new information (zero inflation in the
first period). This is a Bayesian updating, and the expected inflation in this scenario
(πe22 ) will have the form:
πe22 = Pr(D | π1 = 0)E[πD12 ] + Pr(C | π1 = 0)[0]
= Pr(D | π1 = 0)E[πD12 ]
(4.2.5)
The term Pr(D | π1 = 0) is the probability of the central bank being
discretionary given that the private agents have observed zero inflation in the first
period. We can use the Bayes Theorem to find this probability:
P (D | π1 = 0) =
P (π1 = 0 | D)p
P (π1 = 0 | D)p+ 1− p
(4.2.6)
If we define ω ≡ P (π1 = 0 |D), then the expected inflation in this scenario will
be:
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πe22 =
pωϕα
(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
κ (4.2.7)
Appendix A.6.3
In the second period, the discretionary monetary authority will always play
the optimal discretionary policy. If the central bank has set πD11 , then, given πe12 the
response will be:
πD12 = ϕακ (4.2.8)
If he instead set πD21 , such that private agents expect πe22 (4.2.7), then the optimal
response is:
πD22 =
(1 + p(ω − 1))ϕα
(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
κ (4.2.9)
Appendix A.6.4
Now that we have the game well set up, we can compare the outcomes to
see which decision the discretionary central bank would take. Let us denote LD1 as
the intertemporal welfare loss associated with the central bank deceiving people in
the first round. Analogously, LD2 is the intertemporal welfare loss of the central bank
pretending to be conservative.
LD1 = ϕκ2[1 + ϕα2]
[(
1




LD2 = ϕκ2[1 + ϕα2]
[
1 + ϕα2
(1 + ϕα2(1− p))2
+ δ
(
1 + p(ω − 1)
(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
)2] (4.2.10)
Appendix A.6.5
It isn’t straightforward to compare the equations. I will reserve for the
appendix A.6.6 the demonstration that there are situations in which the discretionary
central bank will behave conservatively.
This model shows that reputation building can be the equilibrium even in
a finite game with rational agents. But it doesn’t address the issues mentioned in
the previous section: the importance of instrument observability. The difficulty to
precisely monitor the policy instruments makes it harder to build a reputation.
5. DOES IT STILL MATTER?
After almost four decades of low inflation in the advanced economies, a
skeptical reader might question: "Does this matter at all now?" I argue that yes, it
still matters. In this chapter, I explain why I think that this literature is relevant even
today.
First, we must not forget that one of the reasons (although not the only one)
most advanced countries have low inflation today is their independent central bank.
Even though it’s hard to establish causal inference, most evidence suggests this was
a relevant factor. This is especially clear for the regime change from the ’60s and ’70s
highly discretionary monetary policy to the more independent central banks of the ’80s
and ’90s. That said, I concede that inflation, particularly after the Financial Crisis, is a
complex phenomenon, having other reasons to be that low.
Second, and most importantly, there are crucial lessons to be learned from
the rules versus discretion debate. The relevance of time consistency isn’t restrained
to the inflation bias, it matters for other challenges we face today. Woodford (2013)
investigates how time inconsistency can affect the effectiveness of Forward Guidance.
With the Zero-Lower Bound binding, the central bank would like to signal that
monetary policy will be expansionary for a long time. But if the private agents
believe this and adjust their expectations, then the normalization of conditions would
happen sooner, such that the central bank would have incentives to deviate from
the announced path. This policy is time-inconsistent. Filardo and Hofmann (2014)
provides a similar analysis, and Nakata and Sunakawa (2019) build a formal model of
the credibility of Forward Guidance.
Finally, I argue that even outside the context of monetary policy, the
rules versus discretion debate is useful. Consider patent policy. Imagine
that the policymaker promises generous life-long patent protection, incentivizing
entrepreneurs to invent new products and ideas. But once this stock of good ideas
exists, the policymaker could deviate from the promise and break patent protection.
The patent policy of a country must be credible to be time consistent.
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In any situation in which people’s expectations interact with policy actions,
we might have time consistency problems. We can build institutional solutions that
might alleviate that, but it isn’t without its trade-offs. Also, institutions are not
immutable. Policymaking in democracies is, by a consequence of the democratic
process, discretionary. Policymakers can unbind their hands just as they can bind them.
It’s not just a matter of institutional solutions, but credible institutional solutions.
6. CONCLUSION
As we saw, discretionary policymaking in a framework with rational agents
can lead to suboptimal results. In the context of monetary policy, the inefficiency
emerges as an inflation bias. The problem of the discretionary policy is that a better
equilibrium isn’t time consistent. The ability of the policymaker to ad-hoc decide a
policy is what drives this result. The outcomes can be improved by using rules, rather
than discretion.
The first explored solution was to bind the central bank to a strict rule, such
as the zero-inflation rule. It manages to defeat the inflation bias but at the cost
of eliminating the stabilization of the offer shocks. The policymaker can seek an
intermediate solution by delegating monetary policy to an independent monetary
authority. A conservative central bank can achieve a lower inflation bias without
distorting too much the stabilization policy. The powerful result is that it’s always
socially optimal to have a central bank values fighting inflation more than society itself.
The last institutional solution model exposed another margin of adjustment:
how much independence to grant. The state-contingent rule allows the central bank to
set inflation in normal periods, but the policymaker holds the option of overruling
when a crisis hits. I also discuss the time consistency of institutional solutions
themselves. Policymakers have discretionary power to build institutions, so they have
the power to modify them. We shouldn’t consider them as immutable. This last model
deals with this problem more explicitly by assuming that policy is distorted during
exceptional times.
Finally, reputation building by a discretionary central bank can diminish the
inflation bias problem. This equilibrium doesn’t necessarily rely on infinite time
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A. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
A.1 MODEL 1: DISCRETIONARY POLICYMAKER
A.1.1 OPTIMAL INFLATION FOR THE DISCRETIONARY CENTRAL BANK
Here I solve the optimization problem depicted in (2.2.4). First, we must
substitute the output yt with the supply function (2.2.1). Then the problem becomes:
min
πt
π2t + ϕ(yn + α(πt − πet ) + ε− y∗)2 (A.1.1)
Then take the derivative of this function with respect to πt, considering all the
other variables as constants, and equal to zero to find the critical point:
2πt + (2)(α)ϕ(yn + α(πt − πet ) + ε− y∗) = 0 (A.1.2)




[y∗ − yn + απet − εt] (A.1.3)
The same expression of (2.2.5), only that there we denoted κ ≡ y∗ − yn
A.1.2 DISCRETIONARY INFLATION EXPECTATION
Here I develop the steps required to obtain the result in (2.2.7). The expected
inflation is obtained by taking the expected level of the reaction function of the
policymaker:
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Remember that the expected value is a linear operator, so we can break the




[E[κ] + αE[πet ]− E[εt]] (A.1.5)
The output gap κ is a constant, so E[κ] = κ. The expected value of the expected
inflation is, naturally, the expected inflation, therefore E[πet ] = πet . And the expected









By isolating πet we find the expression in (2.2.7):
πet = ϕακ (A.1.7)
A.1.3 EXPECTED WELFARE IN THE DISCRETIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
Here we explain how to obtain the expression (2.2.11). First, we need to plug


















We can easily simplify the second term because the inflation bias will cancel














Now we need to open the quadratic terms and take the expected value. It’s
important to remember that the expected value of the square of a random variable
with zero mean is its variance: Var[εt] = E[ε2t ]− E[εt]2 = σ2 − 0 = σ2. Also, because the
expected value of εt is zero, all the terms with it (not the ones squared as mentioned
before) will have zero expected value. So we have:
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This is the same expression as (2.2.11).
A.1.4 EXPECTED WELFARE IN THE SOCIALLY OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIUM
Here I obtain the expression (2.2.12). As in the other cases, we need to plug the


















Note the similarity between this expression and the one of the discretionary









































And this is the expression found in (2.2.12)
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A.2 MODEL 2: ZERO-INFLATION RULE
A.2.1 EXPECTED WELFARE IN A SIMPLE RULE EQUILIBRIUM
Here I obtain the expression (3.1.2). As before, I plug the equilibrium outcomes
(3.1.1) into the social loss function:
L = (0)2 + ϕ (yn − y∗ + α (0− 0) + εt)2
= ϕ(−κ+ εt)2
(A.2.1)
Given the simplicity of this simple rule, it’s very easy to obtain (3.1.2):
E[L] = ϕ(κ2 + σ2) (A.2.2)
A.2.2 SIMPLE RULE VERSUS DISCRETION
Here we find the expression (3.1.3), comparing the expected welfare of the
simple rule against the discretionary equilibrium.
Remember that we are working with a social loss function, so the lower
the value of the loss function, the better. The zero-inflation rule is better than the
discretionary equilibrium if the expected welfare loss of the rule is lower than the
















It’s not very hard to simplify this expression, we can throw the κ to the right-








Now we can divide the expression by ϕ (which is always positive so the
inequality doesn’t changes signs) and simplify:
[





1 + ϕα2 − 1
]
κ2 (A.2.5)
Finally, by simplifying and rearranging the terms we obtain (3.1.3):
σ2 < κ2(1 + ϕα2) (A.2.6)
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A.3 MODEL 3: INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK
A.3.1 OPTIMIZATION FOR THE CONSERVATIVE CENTRAL BANK
Here I develop the optimization problem (3.2.3). First, we can open the
quadratic terms and take the expected value (similarly as we have done in the previous

























By taking the derivative with respect to ϕ̃, the first order conditions yields:
2ϕ̃α2κ2 + σ2
[




We can simplify the expression by dividing everything by 2α2 and throwing
the expression with σ2 to the right-hand side :
ϕ̃κ2 = σ2
[

















As mentioned, we can’t isolate ϕ̃ and find a nice expression as in the previous
cases, but we can prove that there exists ϕ̃ ∈ (0, ϕ) such that this expression is








We must show that ∃ϕ̃ that respect (A.3.6). First, note that both functions are
continuous and differentiable. Second, g(0) = 0 and it’s strictly increasing, that is:













Because both functions are continuous, then there must be at least one point in
(0, ϕ) such that (A.3.6) is satisfied. To visualize why this is the case, I plot in figure A.1 a
generic example of these functions. To make this plot I used ϕ = 2, σ2 = 4, κ = 1, α = 1,
but it will work with any values that respect our assumptions (such as positive variance
and output gap).
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A.4 MODEL 4: STATE-CONTINGENT RULE
A.4.1 SOCIAL WELFARE IN STATE-CONTINGENT RULE
Here I show how to find the social welfare function in (3.3.5). The process
is very similar to the previous sections. The only difference is that I won’t take the
expected value. Also, the expected inflation is consider as given. Plugging the reaction












(κ+ απet − εt)− απet + εt
]2
(A.4.1)






(κ+ απet − εt)2 +
ϕ
(1 + ϕ̃α2)2
(−κ− απet + εt)2 (A.4.2)
We can simplify the expression even further by remembering that, because the
expressions are squared, it holds that (κ+ απet − εt)2 = (−κ− απet + εt)2. Such that we






(κ+ απet − εt)
2 (A.4.3)
For the social welfare function if the policymaker overrules it makes it easier
to note that it will be the same of the conservative welfare function, only changing ϕ̃













[κ+ απet − εt]
2 + τ
(A.4.4)
A.4.2 CONDITIONS FOR OVERRULING
Here I show how to find (3.3.6) and also (3.3.9).





[κ+ απet − εt]





(κ+ απet − εt)
2 (A.4.5)
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(1 + ϕα2)(ϕ+ ϕ̃2α2)− ϕ(1 + ϕ̃α2)2
(1 + ϕ̃α2)2(1 + ϕα2)
)
(κ+ απet − εt)
2
(A.4.6)




(1 + ϕα2)(1 + ϕ̃α2)2
(κ+ απet − εt)
2 (A.4.7)
To find the expression in (3.3.9) we must first isolate the squared term. Also,
instead of working with (κ+απet − εt)2, lets work with the equivalent (−κ−απet + εt)2:
(−κ− απet + εt)
2 < τ
(1 + ϕα2)(1 + ϕ̃α2)2
α2(ϕ− ϕ̃)2
(A.4.8)
Note that this is an inequality with an squared term, so when we take the root




(1 + ϕα2)(1 + ϕ̃α2)2
α2(ϕ− ϕ̃)2
< −κ− απet + εt <
√
τ
(1 + ϕα2)(1 + ϕ̃α2)2
α2(ϕ− ϕ̃)2
(A.4.9)









τ(1 + ϕα2) (A.4.10)




to make the expression simpler.
A.5 MODEL 5: REPUTATION IN AN INFINITE GAME
A.5.1 EXPECTED WELFARE OF COOPERATION
Here we develop the expression (4.1.3) and (4.1.4). It’s quite easy to find the
expressions given that in our simpler output function (4.1.2) we don’t have output
shocks. As in the previous models, we simply take the expected value of the welfare
loss function considering the equilibrium valuers:
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E[L] = E
[
(π̄)2 + ϕ [−κ+ α(π̄ − π̄)]2
]
= π̄2 + ϕκ2
(A.5.1)
This is the expression exposed in (4.1.3). For the intertemporal expected social
welfare function we have a convergent geometric series:
∞∑
i=0















If you don’t remember, the general rule for a geometric series is the following:
∞∑
n=0
axn = a+ ax+ ax2 + ax3 + . . . =
a
1− x
if |x| < 1 (A.5.3)
In our example we have a = π̄2 + ϕκ2 and x = δ. By assumption we have
δ ∈ [0, 1), which guarantees that the series converges.
A.5.2 EXPECTED WELFARE OF DECEPTION: ONE-TIME GAIN
Here we find the expression (4.1.6). We must plug the inflation (4.1.5) into the




















A.5.3 COMPARING DECEPTION WITH COOPERATION (FIRST PERIOD)
I want to show here that the expected welfare loss of deception is always at
least as low as the expected welfare loss of cooperation in the first period. That is,
show that (4.1.6) is lower than (4.1.3):
ϕ
1 + ϕα2
[κ+ απ̄]2 ≤ π̄2 + ϕκ2 (A.5.6)
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We can multiply the right-hand side with 1 + ϕα2 and pass all the terms to the
left-hand side, opening the squared term:
0 ≤ π̄2 + ϕα2π̄2 + ϕκ2 + ϕ2α2κ2 − ϕ(κ2 + 2απ̄κ+ α2κ2) (A.5.7)
This expressions simplifies to
0 ≤ π̄2 + ϕ2α2κ2 − 2ϕαπ̄κ (A.5.8)
A savvy reader can see that this expression can be exposed as:
0 ≤ (π̄ − ϕακ)2 (A.5.9)
This inequality will always be true, given that a squared term cannot be
negative. Also, we can infer that the expected welfare loss of deception is always lower
than cooperation (in the first period), only being equal if π̄ = ϕακ.
A.5.4 INTERTEMPORAL WELFARE FOR THE DECEPTION EQUILIBRIUM
Here we find the expression (4.1.9). In the first period we will have the
expected welfare associated with deception and then we return to the discretionary
equilibrium, so the intertemporal expected social welfare is:
∞∑
i=0
δiE [L] = ϕ
1 + ϕα2










A.5.5 SHOWING THAT THE DISCRETIONARY POLICYMAKER MIGHT SET
ZERO INFLATION
Here I show that, under certain conditions, (4.1.10) is satisfied. Instead of
proving for the general case, I will demonstrate that with a specific example. Let’s
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A.6 MODEL 6: REPUTATION IN A FINITE GAME
A.6.1 EXPECTED INFLATION IN THE FIRST PERIOD
Here I show how to obtain the expected inflation in the first period (4.2.2).
It’s actually quite simple. The agents expect an average between what a conservative
central bank would set (zero) and a discretionary central bank would set (4.2.1). The
weights are the priors probabilities of each type:
πe1 = Pr(D)E[πD11 ] + Pr(C)(0) (A.6.1)









1 + ϕα2(1− p)
κ
(A.6.2)
A.6.2 OPTIMAL DISCRETIONARY RESPONSE TO πe1
What would the best-response for a discretionary central bank given the πe1.
That’s the expression (4.2.3). We find it by plugging the expected inflation (4.2.2) into













1 + ϕα2(1− p)
κ
(A.6.3)
A.6.3 EXPECTED INFLATION IF π1 = 0
Here I show how to find (4.2.7). Again the expected inflation will be an
average, but now, instead of working with a prior, the agents will update the
probabilities of the central bank being each type. The agents will use the information
π1 = 0 to update their beliefs. By using the Bayes Theorem the posterior of probability
is:
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P (D | π1 = 0) =
P (π1 = 0 | D)P (D)
P (π1 = 0 | D)P (D) + P (π1 = 0 | C)P (C)
=
P (π1 = 0 | D)p
P (π1 = 0 | D)p+ 1− p
=
pω
1 + p(ω − 1)
(A.6.4)
In which we denoted ω ≡ P (π1 = 0 | D).
Now we do the same thing as before, but using this updated probability
instead of the pior p:
πe22 =
pω













(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
κ
(A.6.5)
A.6.4 OPTIMAL DISCRETIONARY RESPONSE TO πe22
Here I show how to obtain (4.2.9). The process is the same as before. We plug

















(1 + p(ω − 1))ϕα
(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
κ
(A.6.6)
A.6.5 SOCIAL WELFARE LOSS
Here I show how to obtain (4.2.10). We need to compute the payoffs of each
period with the discount factor. Because this game only has two periods, it’s simply:
LD1 = LD11 + δLD12
LD2 = LD21 + δLD22
(A.6.7)
Where, for example, LD22 is the second-period social welfare loss associated
with the discretionary central bank that has imitated a conservative central bank in the
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first period. To compute those welfare losses we need to input the respective inflation
and expected inflation into the welfare loss function.












1 + ϕα2(1− p)
κ− p ϕα




By doing simplifications as we did with the previous examples we arrive at:
LD11 = κ2
ϕ(1 + ϕα2)
[1 + ϕα2(1− p)]2
(A.6.9)
Finding LD12 is easier, given that is analogous to the discretionary equilibrium
of the previous chapters. We plug (4.2.8) and (4.2.4) into the welfare function:
LD12 = (ϕακ)2 + ϕ(−κ+ α(ϕακ− ϕακ))2
= ϕκ2(1 + ϕα2)
(A.6.10)
LD1 is the intertemporal sum of LD11 and LD12 :
LD1 = κ2 ϕ(1 + ϕα
2)
[1 + ϕα2(1− p)]2
+ δϕκ2(1 + ϕα2)
= ϕκ2[1 + ϕα2]
[(
1




Similarly, to find LD21 we plug πD21 = 0 and (4.2.2) into the welfare function:













(1 + ϕα2(1− p))
]2
(A.6.13)
To obtain LD22 we plug (4.2.9) and (4.2.7) into the social welfare loss function:
LD22 =
[
(1 + p(ω − 1))ϕα








(1 + p(ω − 1))ϕα
(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
κ− pωϕα
(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
κ
)]2 (A.6.14)
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After lots of algebra, the equation simplifies to
LD22 = ϕκ2[1 + ϕα2]
(
1 + p(ω − 1)
(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
)2
(A.6.15)
The intertemporal welfare loss of the discretionary policymaker imitating the
conservative central bank is
LD2 = ϕκ2[1 + ϕα2]
[
1 + ϕα2
(1 + ϕα2(1− p))2
+ δ
(
1 + p(ω − 1)
(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
)2]
(A.6.16)
A.6.6 SHOWING THAT THE DISCRETIONARY POLICYMAKER MIGHT
BEHAVE CONSERVATIVELY
To show that the discretionary policymaker might want to set inflation to zero,




(1 + ϕα2(1− p))2
+ δ
(
1 + p(ω − 1)
(1− p)(1 + ϕα2) + pω
)2]
< ϕκ2[1 + ϕα2]
[(
1




This expression simplifies to:
1 + ϕα2
(1 + ϕα2(1− p))2
+ δ
(
1 + p(ω − 1)





1 + ϕα2(1− p)
)2
+ δ (A.6.18)
Instead of providing full proof that shows the conditions under this expression
are satisfied, I will show that for a certain condition this expression is satisfied. I will
postulate that ϕ = 1, α = 1, p = 1/2, ω = 2/3. Then the conditions are
1 + 1
(1 + (1− 1/2))2
+ δ
(
1 + (1/2)(2/3− 1)














So, under the conditions of the example, if the central bank has a discount
factor higher than 73%, then it’s worth setting the low inflation in the first period.
